Taking a Byte out of International Tax Evasion: Combating Base Erosion and Profit Shifting by Greenberg, Rachel J.
Chapman Law Review
Volume 19 | Issue 1 Article 10
2015
Taking a Byte out of International Tax Evasion:
Combating Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
Rachel J. Greenberg
Chapman University, Fowler School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chapman Law Review by an authorized editor of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rachel J. Greenberg, Taking a Byte out of International Tax Evasion: Combating Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 19 Chap. L. Rev. 307
(2016).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol19/iss1/10
Do Not Delete 3/5/2016 12:11 PM 
 
307 
Taking a Byte out of International Tax 
Evasion: Combating Base Erosion and  
Profit Shifting 
Rachel J. Greenberg* 
INTRODUCTION 
Benjamin Franklin said that nothing is certain except death 
and taxes. However, this popular slogan must not ring true; in 
today’s economy, some of the world’s largest multinational 
companies have found loopholes in the tax system and manage to 
evade paying billions of dollars worth of taxes in various 
jurisdictions.1 Obviously, to the common folk, the ability of 
companies to evade this surety of life is troublesome.  
International efforts, led by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), have been undertaken in 
an attempt to combat the issue of base erosion and profit shifting 
(BEPS). Erosion of the tax base occurs when multinational 
companies shift profits from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax 
jurisdictions, so companies pay significantly lower taxes than 
they otherwise would.2 The OECD enacted its Action Plan in 
2013,3 and a number of countries have been working to 
implement facets of the plan since that time. While the Action 
Plan is an important attempt to create social justice by allowing 
governments to regain corporate taxes generated by 
multinational entities, this will require ameliorating actions by 
 
 * J.D., Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law, May 2016; B.A., 
University of California, Los Angeles, June 2011. I wish to express my gratitude to 
Professor Stephanie Lascelles for her assistance and feedback, as well as the entirety of 
Chapman Law Review for their comments and advice throughout the editing process. I 
would like to dedicate this Comment to my family, and thank them for their unwavering 
love and support in all endeavors I pursue. 
 1 Jim Edwards, Here’s How Much Money Apple Avoids Paying in Taxes by 
Pretending It’s Based in Ireland, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 11, 2014, 12:59 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-much-money-apple-avoids-paying-in-taxes-2014-6 
[perma.cc/P7T9-EKUJ] (stating that between 2011 and 2012, Apple was able to avoid 
paying $12.5 billion in U.S. taxes). 
 2 About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD,  http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-
about.htm [perma.cc/B3SZ-UMYQ]. 
 3 OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013), 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2313331e.pdf?expires=1447316590&id=i 
d&accname=guest&checksum=024E863CD25458C99B042F1F03A46A16 [hereinafter 
ACTION PLAN]. 
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all involved parties and cooperative rather than competitive 
behavior. However, until the goals of the Action Plan align with 
those of the individual countries affected by BEPS, it is unlikely 
that the Action Plan will accomplish its stated objectives.   
This Comment will provide a background of the problem of 
BEPS, from the time of its inception through the present day. It 
will then explore the economic problems of selected countries 
that represent the spectrum of the parties involved in addressing 
this problem and certain unilateral solutions they are 
undertaking. Specifically, it will examine the United States as a 
high-tax jurisdiction, which is the home of most of the offending 
companies, the United Kingdom as a relatively high-tax 
jurisdiction, which is a European Union member, India as a 
developing source country, and Bermuda as a tax haven. The 
United States and the United Kingdom are OECD members, 
India is a non-member observer country, and Bermuda has no 
OECD affiliation.4 Finally, this Comment will focus on several 
recommendations which could be implemented multilaterally to 
accomplish the goals of the OECD’s Action Plan.  
I. BACKGROUND 
In order to have a comprehensive understanding of the issue 
of BEPS and make suggestions which could reasonably be 
integrated into the international tax regime, it is necessary to 
consider the evolution of the dilemma and the actions that have 
already been attempted. This Part will cover the formation of the 
OECD, a focused history of the issue of BEPS, and a factual 
overview of the OECD’s recently published Action Plan. 
A.  Formation of the OECD 
In the early 1900s, most businesses were located within the 
borders of a single country.5 Although firms occasionally operated 
across national borders, company wealth and property were 
generally bundled within a single country where the firm was 
subject to taxation.6 Each country created its own domestic laws 
regarding taxation of corporations.7 As industrialization 
continued, companies began to do business in multiple countries, 
and, eventually, multinational corporations developed. Questions 
arose as to how to allocate profits to different countries so each 
 
 4 About the OECD: Members and Partners, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/ 
membersandpartners/ [http://perma.cc/KNT6-HFRW]. 
 5 Steven A. Bank, The Globalization of Corporate Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 
1307, 1307 (2013). 
 6 Id.  
 7 ACTION PLAN, supra note 3, at 7, 9. 
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country could share in taxing the company. However, sometimes 
the independent rules for different countries conflicted, causing 
friction, and potential double taxation, defined as taxation of the 
same income in both countries in which the company does 
business.8 In the 1920s, the League of Nations recognized that 
double taxation would slow economic growth and recovery, and 
international tax laws were designed to limit this friction and to 
support global economic growth.9 “International co-operation has 
resulted in shared principles and a network of thousands of 
bilateral tax treaties that are based on common standards and 
that therefore generally result in the prevention of double 
taxation on profits from cross-border activities.”10 Bilateral 
treaties have been formulated to encourage foreign companies to 
engage in businesses, which will generate income in the 
home   country, and domestic companies to earn revenue in 
foreign countries, by creating tax laws which are favorable to all 
entities.   
Conflicts frequently occur between residence and source 
countries regarding taxable income. The residence country is 
where the company is formed or managed and controlled 
(frequently the United States or another highly developed 
country), and the source country is one in which the company 
does business, in terms of having factories, research and 
development, or sales.11 Through the application of bilateral tax 
treaties and local source country tax law, residence countries 
have maintained principal taxing jurisdictions for income earned 
in source countries.12 As a result, source countries have retained 
minimal (or no) tax jurisdiction, which creates friction between 
the source and residence countries, because the source countries 
believe they are entitled to a portion of the taxes.13 This enables 
multinational entities (MNEs) to operate in other countries but 
pay tax in those countries to the extent they operate through a 
separate entity located in the source country or through a 
permanent establishment (PE) in the source country.14 “This 
 
 8 Id. at 9. 
 9 Id. at 7. 
 10 Id. at 9–10. 
 11 Source and Residence Taxation, TAX JUST. NETWORK, http://www.taxjustice.net/ 
cms/upload/pdf/Source_and_residence_taxation_-_SEP-2005.pdf [perma.cc/7QNW-7645]. 
 12 See Lee A. Sheppard, Twilight of the International Consensus: How Multinationals 
Squandered Their Tax Privileges, 44 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 62 (2014). 
 13 See id. 
 14 See id. In the United States, a “PE generally is defined as a fixed place of 
business.” PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, WORLDWIDE TAX SUMMARIES: CORPORATE TAXES 
2014/15, at 2117 (2014), http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/corporate-tax/worldwide-tax-sum 
maries/assets/pwc-worldwide-tax-summaries-corporate-2014-15.pdf [http://perma.cc/8TV 
B-MRSR] [hereinafter TAX SUMMARIES]. The definition of a PE may vary in other 
countries. For example, in the United Kingdom, the definition of a PE is partially based 
Do Not Delete 3/5/2016 12:11 PM 
310 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 19:1 
limitation of tax jurisdiction is key to the OECD model treaty,”15 
because it prevents double taxation and encourages commerce 
between treaty countries. 
After World War II, the Organisation for European Economic 
Co-operation (OEEC) was established to implement the Marshall 
Plan, financed by the United States, with the goal of boosting the 
economy.16 It was at this juncture that the collective 
governments acknowledged the “interdependence of their 
economies, [which] paved the way for a new era of cooperation 
that was to change the face of Europe.”17 The OECD was created 
on September 30, 1961,18 representing over thirty countries, 
whose members include the United States and many European 
countries,19 as well as observers like India and China.20 With 
globalization, a shift has occurred from country-specific models to 
global operating models, and, with the advent of a greater service 
component and digital products, it is “much easier for businesses 
to locate many productive activities in geographic locations that 
are distant from the physical location of their customers.”21 
However, multinational corporations are currently manipulating 
tax rules set forth in the OECD model treaty, allowing them to 
pay taxes in low-tax jurisdictions while making large profits in 
other countries.22 This is harmful for a number of reasons. 
Governments receive lower corporate tax payments than they 
should, individual taxpayers have a greater tax burden to make 
up the difference, and domestic companies are placed at a 
competitive disadvantage.23 Also, public awareness of low tax 
payments can damage a company’s reputation.24  
 
 
on the OECD model, and a non-resident company can have a PE if it “has a fixed place of 
business in the United Kingdom through which the business of the company is wholly or 
partly carried on, or an agent acting on behalf of the company has and habitually 
exercises authority to do business on behalf of the company in the United Kingdom.” Id. 
at 2093. 
 15 Sheppard, supra note 12. 
 16 About the OECD: History, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/history/ [http://per 
ma.cc/45QP-GVL7]. 
 17 Id.  
 18 Id.  
 19 See Tracy A. Kaye, The Offshore Shell Game: U.S. Corporate Tax Avoidance 
Through Profit Shifting, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 185, 187–88 n.19 (2014).  
 20 Sheppard, supra note 12, at 64. 
 21 ACTION PLAN, supra note 3, at 7. 
 22 See Sheppard, supra note 12, at 61–63. 
 23 Foreign companies can lower their profits based on local taxes and international 
treaties, which reduce withholding tax on royalties and/or interest payments, while 
domestic companies cannot decrease their tax burden in this way. See id.    
 24 See ACTION PLAN, supra note 3, at 8. 
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B.  History of BEPS 
The main cause of base erosion, or erosion of the tax base 
which determines tax liability, is profit shifting. “Profit shifting 
allows U.S. multinationals to maintain their actual investments 
in high-tax countries that have the appropriate infrastructure 
and labor forces necessary for actual business operations but 
report profits in tax havens or low-tax jurisdictions.”25 Various 
studies estimate that the United States loses between $10 billion 
and $90 billion annually from profit shifting, which has brought 
the enormity of the issue to public scrutiny.26 International tax 
rules allow loopholes which, while exempting companies from 
double taxation, enable them to avoid taxation completely and 
enjoy “double non-taxation.”27 
Profit shifting is particularly easy for intellectual property 
(IP) income, because there is no production location and 
consumers can be anywhere.28 A number of multinational 
technology companies have moved assets like IP “to Ireland, 
whose low 12.5% corporate income tax rate allowed it to attract 
major corporations and become a center of high technology jobs 
in Europe.”29 To avoid incurring higher taxes, some companies 
employ the “Double Irish” tax structure.30 For example, an 
American company forms two subsidiary companies in Ireland, 
but one of them has its management center in Bermuda or a 
similar tax haven. The company based in Bermuda pays the 
parent company a fee to allow it to sublicense its IP to the other 
Irish subsidiary, which can then sell the products 
internationally.31 “The Bermuda-based company is an Irish 
company for U.S. purposes, which presumably aids in the 
approval of the transfer pricing arrangement because of the 
presence of a U.S.-Ireland tax treaty, but is a Bermuda company 
for Irish purposes, which allows it to avoid Irish taxes.”32 
Therefore, the American company has low taxable U.S. income, 
and the Bermuda-based company has no income subject to Irish 
 
 25 Kaye, supra note 19, at 185–86.  
 26 Id. at 187; see also Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55, 57–58 
(2014). 
 27 See Kaye, supra note 19, at 187.  
 28 See id.; see also Bank, supra note 5, at 1310. 
 29 Bank, supra note 5, at 1310. 
 30 Id. at 1310–11. 
 31 Id. The licensing fee paid to the parent company will be based on the fair market 
value of the license (using an arm’s length standard). However, this fee may be a 
relatively small amount compared to what the parent company would otherwise pay in 
taxes. See id. at 1311.  
 32 Id.  The Bermuda-based company is an Irish non-resident company under Irish 
law. Ireland only requires “resident” companies to pay standard corporate taxes. TAX 
SUMMARIES, supra note 14, at 886–87. 
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tax, because Irish law uses the location where the company is 
controlled and managed (i.e. Bermuda) to determine tax 
residency.33 So, most of the income is attributed to Bermuda, 
with no corporate tax.34  
Three popular mechanisms for accomplishing profit shifting 
are hybrid mismatches, special purpose entities (SPE), and 
transfer pricing.35 Hybrid mismatches create double non-taxation 
or long-term tax deferral when different countries have tax rules 
that are domestically logical but incompatible with the other 
country’s rules.36 This can occur when the MNE  deducts twice 
for the same borrowing, claims deductions without matching 
income, or uses differences between countries’ rules related to 
foreign tax credits or exemptions.37 SPEs are defined as 
companies with minimal physical presence in a host country and 
a small number of employees.38 Their core business involves 
holding activities or group financing, and their assets and 
liabilities are investments in or from other countries.39 Transfer 
pricing allows intangibles to be taxed in a lower-tax jurisdiction 
than the United States.40 According to the IRS rules for transfer 
pricing, MNEs must utilize an arm’s length standard when 
determining the pricing of transactions among members of the 
group, based on the risks and functions of each entity.41 This is 
designed to protect the tax base by preventing the shifting of 
income that otherwise would be taxed in the United States to 
another country.42 The arm’s length standard for transfer pricing 
is regulated in the United States under Section 482 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, and in the 2010 OECD transfer-pricing 
guidelines, so “the prices charged in transactions between 
commonly controlled parties must be consistent with the 
consideration in, or results of, similar transactions between 
uncontrolled taxpayers.”43 Transfer prices divide the profits of a 
MNE among countries based on risks and functions to determine 
 
 33 Bank, supra note 5, at 1311 n.30. 
 34 Id. at 1311. 
 35 Patrick Love, What is BEPS and How Can You Stop It?, OECD INSIGHTS (July 19, 
2013), http://oecdinsights.org/2013/07/19/what-is-beps-how-can-you-stop-it/ [http://perma. 
cc/9Q27-URPA].  
 36 See Brauner, supra note 26, at 79. 
 37 ACTION PLAN, supra note 3, at 15. 
 38 Patrick Love, BEPS: Why You’re Taxed More than a Multinational, OECD 
INSIGHTS (Feb. 13, 2013), http://oecdinsights.org/2013/02/13/beps-why-youre-taxed-more-
than-a-multinational/ [http://perma.cc/U98A-EWCA]. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Brauner, supra note 26, at 96. 
 41 Kaye, supra note 19, at 186. 
 42 Id.  
 43 ROBERT T. COLE & WILLIAM H. BYRNES, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. TRANSFER 
PRICING § 1.02 (3d ed. 2014). Most countries have enacted similar transfer pricing rules. Id. 
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how much income is taxed in each country. Over the past twenty 
years, transfer-pricing rules have become stricter in the United 
States and in foreign countries, but some observers believe that 
“MNEs are still using transfer pricing to improperly shift income 
from the jurisdictions where they function (developed countries 
and developing countries) to low-tax jurisdictions, significantly 
eroding the tax base.”44 However, due to transfer pricing and 
profit shifting, in 2008, American multinational companies 
claimed to earn 43% of overseas profits in Ireland, Bermuda, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Switzerland (all considered tax 
havens), while only 7% of their international investments and 4% 
of foreign employees were located there.45  
It has been calculated that “[a]round 60% of world trade 
actually takes place within multinational enterprises.”46 This 
large percentage accounts for the billions of dollars lost each year 
to the governments of various jurisdictions where these 
companies avoid the payment of taxes, “undermin[ing] voluntary 
compliance by all taxpayers” and threatening the foundation of 
modern tax administration.47 The OECD itself admits that there 
must be cooperative, international efforts implemented, because 
unilateral efforts made by individual countries will likely lead to 
the troubling alternative of double-taxation, which treaties years 
ago were created to avoid.48 A number of issues need to be 
resolved, including how to divide taxes between source and 
residence countries, how to tax IP, and how to deal with havens 
and enablers, who may have no incentive to change.  
C.  Current Status of the Plan 
A number of countries have expressed concern regarding the 
way tax rights are allocated between countries.49 “The G20 
finance ministers called on the OECD to develop an action plan 
to address BEPS issues in a co-ordinated and comprehensive 
manner.”50 In February 2013, the OECD released its Action Plan, 
designed to aid countries struggling to increase tax revenues and 
suffering from companies evading tax payments in high-tax 
 
 44 Id. 
 45 Kaye, supra note 19, at 186. 
 46 Love, supra note 38. 
 47 Id.  
 48 Id. The chairman of the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD 
feels that “if the project does not come up with multilateral agreed solutions which match 
the needs of many countries, then many countries are going to act unilaterally, and that 
is going to be worse for business than any multilateral solution that you can envisage.” 
Katy O’Donnell, OECD Seeks to Curb Corporate Tax Avoidance, CQ ROLL CALL, Sept. 17, 
2014, 2014 WL 4628469. 
 49 ACTION PLAN, supra note 3, at 11. 
 50 Id. 
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jurisdictions.51 “The OECD BEPS Action Plan seeks to realign 
taxation with the relevant economic substance and ensure that 
taxable profits cannot be artificially shifted.”52 Simply put, 
everyone should pay their fair share of taxes. The goal of the plan 
is to create equity by making corporate taxation more coherent, 
transparent, cooperative, and beneficial on an international 
scale.53  
With a timeline for completion in 2015, the plan includes five 
general categories and fifteen action items.54 The broad 
categories can be divided into: 1) identifying the tax challenges of 
the digital economy, 2) creating international coherence of 
taxation, 3) restoring the effects and advantages of international 
standards, 4) increasing transparency, and 5) implementing the 
actions in a timely manner.55  
The first category includes only the first action item, Action 1, 
which advocates forming a task force to identify options relating 
to tax concerns associated with e-commerce and the digital 
economy.56 The second category includes Actions 2–5, relating to 
neutralizing the effects of hybrid mismatch, strengthening 
controlled foreign corporation (CFC)57 rules, limiting base erosion 
via interest deductions and other financial payments, and 
countering harmful tax practices more effectively, taking into 
account transparency and substance.58 The third category 
involves Actions 6–10, setting international standards for tax 
systems through updates in defining PE status and making sure 
that transfer-pricing outcomes are consistent with value creation, 
 
 51 See OECD Urges Stronger International Co-operation on Corporate Tax, OECD 
(Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.oecd.org/tax/oecd-urges-stronger-international-co-operation-on-
corporate-tax.htm [http://perma.cc/N5SN-T526]. 
 52 Kaye, supra note 19, at 188. 
 53 Sean Rosenthal, Note, The OECD’s International Tax Proposal: The Action Plan, 
33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 20, 23 (2013). 
 54 Base Erosion and Profit-Shifting (BEPS): OECD and Ways & Means Start Taking 
Action, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS: U.S. OUTBOUND NEWSALERT (Aug. 2, 2013), http:// 
www.pwc.com/en_US/us/tax-services-multinationals/newsletters/us-outbound-tax/assets/ 
pwc-beps-oecd-wm-start-taking-action.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q79N-34GQ] [hereinafter Ways 
& Means]. 
 55 Id. at 2. 
 56 ACTION PLAN, supra note 3, at 14–15. There are no specific suggestions regarding 
this action item; it is merely an acknowledgement of the fact that the current rules are 
unable to encompass the challenges intangibles present. See id. 
 57 CFCs are foreign subsidiaries in which U.S. shareholders own at least 50%, by 
value or vote. TAX SUMMARIES, supra note 14, at 2120.  
 58 ACTION PLAN, supra note 3, at 15–18. Recommendations to limit hybrid mismatch 
include disallowing the exemption of deductible payments, double deductions, or 
deductions without corresponding income. Ways & Means, supra note 54, at 3. The plan 
suggests limiting the deduction of interest expenses when the related interest income is 
not being fully taxed. ACTION PLAN, supra note 3, at 17; Ways & Means, supra note 54, at 
3. Action 5 involves reviewing domestic tax regimes of member and non-member 
countries, and evaluating harmful tax practices. ACTION PLAN, supra note 3, at 18. 
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especially relating to intangibles.59 The fourth category deals 
with transparency in Actions 11–14, with the collection and 
analysis of data, requirement to disclose aggressive tax planning 
arrangements, documentation of transfer pricing, and 
improvement in dispute resolution.60 The fifth category is limited 
to Action 15,61 which suggests forming a multilateral instrument 
to facilitate these changes because the OECD has no legal 
standing to enforce its recommendations, and any adopted 
changes must be enacted by all involved parties.62 Various 
aspects of several of these actions will be discussed, but they tend 
to overlap, so it is difficult to evaluate them individually.  
The quick implementation time for the OECD Action Plan 
implies that a number of the actions are underway and have 
been set for completion. The OECD released a discussion draft 
identifying issues raised by the digital economy and possible 
actions to address them in March 2014, and the deadline for 
completion of Action 1 was set for September 2014.63 The OECD 
intended that the Model Tax Convention would be updated with 
changes, and by September 2014, “recommendations regarding 
the design of domestic rules” would be finalized.64 Comparatively, 
 
 59 ACTION PLAN, supra note 3, at 19–20. The goal is to “ensure that entities and 
locations earning income have sufficient substance to justify that income.” Ways & Means, 
supra note 54, at 4–5. 
 60 ACTION PLAN, supra note 3, at 21–23. 
 61 Id. at 24.  
 62 Ways & Means, supra note 54, at 6. 
 63 See ACTION PLAN, supra note 3, at 29. The committee met again in April 2014. See 
generally BEPS Action 1: Address the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, 24 March 
2014–14 April 2014, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-challenges-digital-economy-
discussion-draft-march-2014.pdf [perma.cc/P2CR-BES3]. The OECD issued a 2015 Final 
Report on Action Plan 1 with the recommendations and conclusions of the Task Force on 
the Digital Economy (TFDE). This included recommendations to modify the definition of 
and list of exceptions to PEs, transfer-pricing guidelines, the definition of CFC income, 
and collection of VAT/GST (value added tax/goods and services tax) in cross-border 
transactions. OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, 
Action 1 - 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT 
(Oct. 5, 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241046-en [perma.cc/3Y9C-HKKH]. It 
may be several years before the full effects of any changes made can be seen, as such 
policies take time to implement. The OECD plans to re-evaluate the tax challenges 
regarding the digital economy, and the progress made through the Action Plan, by 2020. 
See id. at 149. 
 64 ACTION PLAN, supra note 3, at 30 (noting also that Action 2’s effort to neutralize 
the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements should be completed by September 2014). 
The OECD released a preliminary report in September 2014. In addition, the recently 
completed 2015 Final Report recommends changes to domestic law and the OECD Model 
Tax Convention, which “will neutralise hybrid mismatches, by putting an end to multiple 
deductions for a single expense, deductions without corresponding taxation or the 
generation of multiple foreign tax credits for one amount of foreign tax paid. 
[This] . . . will prevent these arrangements from being used as a tool for BEPS without 
adversely impacting cross-border trade and investment.” OECD, Neutralising the Effects 
of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2 - 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 BASE 
EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, at 11 (Oct. 5, 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/ 
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the strengthening of the CFC Rules and the related 
recommendations were not to be completed until September 
2015.65 However, aspects of the BEPS plan have been initiated, 
and one observer notes that “the first part of the OECD’s 
ambitious package has been delivered on time and intact. The 
scale and scope of change surpasses what many people had 
anticipated at the outset.”66 
II. EVALUATION OF REPRESENTATIVE COUNTRIES 
Every country seeks to maximize its income—through 
taxation or providing tax incentives for foreign companies—but 
what helps one country may hurt another. A “game theory 
approach” illustrates that the maximum payoff occurs when both 
countries exchange information and cooperate.67 Any country can 
be a source country or residence country at different times, so its 
interests are best protected by exchanging information. If a 
country acts unilaterally to protect its tax base at the expense of 
another country, one will always lose, and the total payoff for the 
countries combined will be lower than if they exchange 
information and work cooperatively.68 In this Comment, four 
countries will be presented as examples of the range of concerns 
and viewpoints involved in BEPS. The tax systems and problems 
faced by the United States as a high-tax jurisdiction, the United 
Kingdom as a relatively high-tax jurisdiction and European 
Union (EU) member, India as a source country, and Bermuda as 
a tax haven will be discussed, along with some innovations which 
may further the BEPS plan. 
A.  The United States 
The United States can be seen as the principal perpetrator 
and victim of BEPS. Many of the world’s largest companies, 
which are central in the BEPS debate, including Google, Amazon, 
Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft, were founded and incorporated 
in the United States. For decades, the defining characteristics 
that associated a company with a specific country were the 
 
9789264241138-en [perma.cc/6TSW-9HA9]. 
 65 ACTION PLAN, supra note 3, at 30. 
 66 Richard Collier, OECD and BEPS: The Most Significant Change in Modern Times, 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS: TAX BLOG (Sept. 16, 2014), http://pwc.blogs.com/tax/2014/09/ 
oecd-and-beps-the-most-significant-change-in-modern-times.html [https://perma.cc/T333-
XJWT]. In October 2015, the OECD released final reports on each of the fifteen actions. 
BEPS 2015 Final Reports, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-2015-final-reports.htm 
(last visited Jan. 9, 2016). 
 67 See Carlo Garbarino, The Use of Cross-Border Corporate Profits and Losses and 
“Global Corporate Tax Information”: A Game Theory Approach, 5 COLUM. J. TAX L. 133, 
153 (2014). 
 68 Id. 
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location of incorporation and its principal place of business.69 
However, a Harvard Business School professor explains that the 
modern business corporation is experiencing a globalization 
process which he describes as “decentering”; “[n]ational identities 
[are] mutat[ing] with remarkable ease and firms are unbundling 
critical headquarters functions and reallocating them 
worldwide.”70 This “decentering” has contributed to a significant 
decline in U.S. corporate tax revenue, which is lower than a 
number of other OECD countries.71 The United States has a 
corporate tax rate of 35% for high-earning corporations,72 one of 
the highest in the world, yet in the United States today, 
“[c]orporate tax receipts as a share of profits are at their lowest 
level in at least 40 years.”73 With such a high tax rate imposed on 
the worldwide income of resident corporations,74 even with a 
number of deductions available, it is not surprising that these 
companies have sought to shift their profits to jurisdictions with 
lower tax rates in an effort to maximize their profits.75   
The Obama Administration recognizes that U.S. taxation 
laws of MNEs must change, and the IRS has reported a gap of up 
to $345 billion between what taxpayers actually pay and what 
they should pay.76 Senator Max Baucus, the former Senate 
Finance Committee Chair, acknowledged, “In the past two 
decades, the number of U.S.-based companies on the Fortune 
Global 500 list has declined by 20 percent. . . . When it comes to 
international tax rules, [the United States has] the worst of all 
worlds.”77 Congress is also in support of working to find 
reasonable solutions that can be implemented in accordance with 
the OECD Action Plan. Congress has considered options such as 
 
 69 Mihir A. Desai, The Decentering of the Global Firm, 32 WORLD ECON. 1271, 1272 
(2009).  
 70 Id.  
 71 Bank, supra note 5, at 1308–09; see also Mihir A. Desai, A Better Way to Tax U.S. 
Businesses, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2012, at 135, 137–38.  
 72 TAX SUMMARIES, supra note 14, at 2116. 
 73 Damian Paletta, With Tax Break, Corporate Rate Is Lowest in Decades, WALL ST. J. 
(Feb. 3, 2012, 1:02 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020466220457719 
9492233215330.html. However, the recent recession may have contributed to the lowering 
of taxable income, by enabling companies to offset profits with previous losses. Id.   
 74 TAX SUMMARIES, supra note 14 (defining a domestic corporation as a company 
organized under the laws of the United States (or any state within the United States) and 
stating that a domestic corporation qualifies as a resident corporation even if the company 
does not conduct any business or own any property within the United States). 
 75 See generally TAX SUMMARIES, supra note 14, at 2120–25 (discussing various 
deductions that companies may use to maximize their profits).  
 76 CYM H. LOWELL & MARK R. MARTIN, TRANSFER PRICING STRATEGIES ¶ 2.04 (2013).  
 77 Senator Max Baucus, Chairman, Senate Fin. Comm., Keynote Address at the 
Bipartisan Policy Center: A Tax Code for the 21st Century (June 11, 2012), http://www.fi 
nance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=7f75cb4c-d83f-405b-8063-b1d7c1d2ea88 
[http://perma.cc/P9NU-6M7K]. 
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a structural reformation to a “purer” worldwide system of 
taxation, or options as drastic as converting to a territorial 
system (only taxing income earned domestically).78 However, a 
number of economists believe that changing to a territorial 
system will only enhance the problems.79 These economists 
acknowledge that IP is one of the primary assets and sources of 
income of the global technology companies, and this 
income-producing asset can easily be “shifted” to a low-tax 
jurisdiction. This is a prime example of where companies take 
advantage of the “Double Irish” structure,80 in which a large 
multinational company incorporates a subsidiary in Ireland, with 
management and control in a country such as Bermuda. That 
subsidiary can incorporate a sales principal in Ireland that is 
licensed by the first Irish company. Although the parent 
company remains in the United States, it is difficult for the 
United States to collect taxes on the profit made by the 
subsidiaries. 
President Obama has also proposed a “one-off 14% tax on 
U.S. profits stashed overseas, as well as a 19% tax on any future 
profits,” but it is still unclear as to whether Congress will 
approve the proposal.81 Under U.S. corporate law, companies are 
not required to pay taxes on profits which are earned by a foreign 
subsidiary, so long as they are not brought back to the United 
States through dividends, leading many of these companies to 
leave earnings abroad rather than reinvest them in the U.S. 
economy.82 As a result, the United States may not be able to tax 
the profits of these foreign subsidiaries, which may facilitate 
further base erosion.83 
 
 78 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR TAXING U.S. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 1 
(2013), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/43764_MultinationalTaxes_rev02-28-2013..pdf 
[http://perma.cc/YEC5-388W]; see also Bank, supra note 5, at 1309. 
 79 See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Why Do We Need Treaties?, 137 TAX NOTES 
825, 825–26 (2012).  
 80 See supra notes 27–34 and accompanying text; see also J. Bryan Lowder, The 
Double Irish and the Dutch Sandwich: The Explainer’s Field Guide to Exotic Tax Dodges, 
SLATE (Apr. 14, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
explainer/2011/04/the_double_irish_and_the_dutch_sandwich.html [http://perma.cc/MJM 
6-53Y6]. 
 81 Obama Plans Tax on US Firms Overseas to Fix Roads at Home, BBC NEWS (Feb. 
2, 2015), http://m.bbc.com/news/business-31085912 [http://perma.cc/25RM-N3VE]. 
 82 Id. The United States is alone in taxing worldwide income; many other countries 
will only tax money earned inside the residence country, in an effort to encourage the 
company to bring the money back to the host country and reinvest it in the economy. 
Mihir A. Desai, Tax Only Corporate Income Earned in the United States, N.Y. TIMES  
(May 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/05/30/how-multinationals-
can-best-be-taxed/tax-only-corporate-income-earned-in-the-united-states [http://perma.cc/ 
NTL3-NLKC]. 
 83 The U.S.-Ireland tax treaty and the use of the “Double Irish” technique facilitate 
lower tax payments by the U.S. parent company. The subsidiary in Ireland claims it has 
little profit which can be taxed in Ireland, and most of the profit earned is attributed to 
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A number of economists believe that it might be in the best 
interest of the United States to lower its corporate tax rates, 
finding that the current rates are hurting smaller companies, 
individuals, and the overall economy of the United States.84 
While campaigning in 2012, both Obama and Romney proposed 
lowering the corporate tax rate to 28% and 25% respectively.85 
The corporate tax rate is a sliding scale based on income; there is 
also an alternative minimum tax (AMT) of 20% over $40,000, 
with fewer deductions.86 Lowering the corporate tax rate would 
presumably encourage companies to do business in the United 
States and pay taxes.  
While many U.S. corporations use foreign tax havens, some 
observers note that the United States can also be a haven for 
foreign corporations.87 Although the United States can act as a 
source or a residence (parent) country, many of the U.S. 
government approaches to base erosion (e.g. a minimum tax) 
address the residence-country problem, while most other 
countries are focusing on the source-country problems.88 CFC 
rules in the United States have been weakened because of the 
check-the-box rules, “which permit elective inconsistent 
treatment or even non-recognition of entities for tax purposes.”89 
This means the taxpayer can choose whether it wants to be a 
corporation, a partnership, or a “disregarded entity” for tax 
purposes.90 While this is helpful for the taxpayer (to reduce 
taxable income), it makes it more difficult for the government to 
collect any taxes.91 Strengthening the CFC rules along with 
 
the non-resident Irish subsidiary in Bermuda, which pays no taxes in Bermuda and owes 
no taxes to Ireland. There will be no taxation unless these funds are repatriated into the 
United States. Bank, supra note 5, 1311–12; see also Kyle Pomerleau, How Much Do U.S. 
Multinational Corporations Pay in Foreign Income Taxes?, TAX FOUND. (May 19, 2014), 
http://taxfoundation.org/article/how-much-do-us-multinational-corporations-pay-foreign 
-income-taxes [http://perma.cc/CT6W-7MMM]. 
 84 See Desai, supra note 82 (“In a world of highly mobile capital and products, 
economic theory and empirical evidence indicate that the least mobile factor – labor – will 
bear the corporate tax. In short, lower investment leads to less productive workers and 
lower wages.”). 
 85 Bank, supra note 5, at 1324. 
 86 TAX SUMMARIES, supra note 14, at 2116.  
 87 Colloquium, Conceptualizing a New Institutional Framework for International 
Taxation, 44 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 7, 28 (2014) [hereinafter Conceptualizing]. 
 88 Id. at 32–33.  
 89 Sheppard, supra note 12, at 71–72. Inconsistent entity treatment between the 
United States and a foreign country does not reduce foreign taxation; it is more likely the 
result of a hybrid instrument, which lowers the tax in one country without a 
compensatory increase in another country. 
 90 Conceptualizing, supra note 87, at 22. 
 91 Id.; see also Sheppard, supra note 12, at 72 (“These [check-the-box] rules have 
been called the single stupidest administrative gesture in the history of the income tax.”). 
However, Congress has made the check-the-box rules less relevant, as it has extended a 
rule that exempts from Subpart F treatment certain dividends, interest, and royalties 
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lowering corporate taxes could help limit BEPS. In March 2014, 
the Obama Administration released some proposals for fiscal 
year 2015, such as:  
the current taxation of excess returns associated with transfers of 
intangibles offshore, the creation of a new category of Subpart F 
income for transactions involving digital goods or services, as well as 
deferral of the interest expense deduction related to the deferred 
income of the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinational corporations.92  
Another unilateral undertaking by the United States is the 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) of 2010.93 This is 
designed to eliminate offshore tax evasion by providing the IRS 
information about U.S. taxpayer bank accounts outside the 
United States, but does not require the United States to supply 
any information to other governments.94 Numerous treaties exist 
between the United States and other countries to decrease the 
percentage of withholding and avoid double taxation. However, 
“FATCA mandates that multinational businesses evaluate entity 
payees differently, engage in withholding on certain gross 
proceeds transactions[,] . . . [and] report different information to 
the IRS.”95 Beginning in July 2014, this required new 
intergovernmental agreements between the U.S. Treasury and 
foreign governments to provide this information.96 While FATCA 
has been called a “hammer,” other countries have agreed that 
they also need information, so “the inevitable result of FATCA 
[will be] a multilateral system.”97 This has the same effect as the 
transparency requirements of the BEPS plan, to provide 
reciprocal information exchange to all governments involved. 
While there are a number of issues relating to BEPS that the 
United States is unilaterally considering in terms of CFC rules, 
lowering corporate taxes, transparency, structural changes in the 
tax laws, and rules governing intangibles, there are few 
suggestions being implemented at this time specifically relating 
to the Action Plan. The only current action that the United 
 
from one foreign subsidiary to another foreign subsidiary. See generally Kenan Mullis, 
Check-the-Box and Hybrids: A Second Look at Elective U.S. Tax Classification for Foreign 
Entities, TAX ANALYSTS (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/features.nsf/ 
Articles/58D8A3375C8ECCD18525793E0055EB9B?OpenDocument [perma.cc/Z6Q8-
NMYD]. 
 92 Kaye, supra note 19, at 190. Subpart F income refers to a type of undistributed 
foreign income from CFCs; it can be “easily transferred to a low-tax jurisdiction.” TAX 
SUMMARIES, supra note 14, at 2120.  
 93 TAX SUMMARIES, supra note 14, at 2134. 
 94 Conceptualizing, supra note 87, at 14. 
 95 TAX SUMMARIES, supra note 14, at 2135. 
 96 Id.  
 97 Conceptualizing, supra note 87, at 27–29 (reporting that the United States already 
has intergovernmental agreements with Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, 
Spain, and Italy). 
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States has considered is moving to adopt country-by-country 
reporting under BEPS.98 While the end results of the U.S. and 
OECD plans may be similar, the goals are really not in line, as 
the United States is trying to capture more income domestically, 
and the OECD is trying to create social justice and equity.  
B.  The United Kingdom 
Similar to the United States, the United Kingdom has 
attempted to cut its corporate tax rate over the past decade to 
maintain business competitiveness; the United Kingdom had the 
sixteenth lowest OECD tax rate in 2006.99 The tax rate has 
continued to decrease, with the main rate of corporate taxation 
set at 21% in April 2014,100 and 20% in April 2015.101 Recently, a 
plan to move to 19% in 2017 was announced.102 The effective 
corporate rate is lower than most households and small 
businesses are paying.103 Unlike the United States, the United 
Kingdom falls under the jurisdiction of the EU and must follow 
tax guidelines set out by the EU. The EU is attempting to 
pressure its member states to stay within certain boundaries and 
work harmoniously to avoid major disparities.104 However, the 
United Kingdom is trying to position itself as a favorable tax 
jurisdiction, with revised CFC rules and rules concerning cross-
border transactions, understanding that this will significantly 
decrease the amount of corporate tax it collects. Since the United 
Kingdom does not want its companies moving operations to 
Ireland, with its very low tax rate, or to other offshore havens, it 
has increased individual tax rates to offset the loss of corporate 
tax income.105  
While the United Kingdom has been actively involved with 
the BEPS project, the government decided to unilaterally initiate 
a new Diverted Profits Tax (DPT), which was enacted in April 
 
 98 There has been a lack of support from the CEOs of various U.S. multinational 
companies regarding the idea that their companies should have to disclose tax and 
financial information. See U.S. CEOs Resist Country-by-Country Tax Reporting -Survey, 
REUTERS (May 1, 2014, 2:26 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/01/usa-tax-
survey-idUSL2N0NN0PG20140501 [http://perma.cc/SF5M-Y5BR]. 
 99 Bank, supra note 5, at 1321. 
 100 TAX SUMMARIES, supra note 14, at 2090. 
 101 Corporation Tax: Main Rate, GOV.UK (July 8, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/govern 
ment/publications/corporation-tax-main-rate [perma.cc/C8TQ-RDJF]. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Bank, supra note 5, at 1322. 
 104 Id. at 1310, 1318 (noting that the EU has pressured Ireland to raise its tax rate of 
12.5%, especially in light of the need for the EU bailout of the Irish government in 2010). 
Several EU members, including Ireland, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg are 
considered tax havens. Sheppard, supra note 12, at 75–76. 
 105 Conceptualizing, supra note 87, at 34–35 (commenting that raising the personal 
income tax rate while lowering corporate taxation will maintain equivalent total tax 
income for the government).    
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2015.106 The U.K. government is concerned that “current rules 
allow foreign businesses contracting with domestic customers to 
pay less tax on the profits generated by those sales.”107 Since its 
e-commerce spending is the highest among the surveyed major 
nations, and it has the “highest proportion of online spending,” 
this particularly concerns the United Kingdom.108 This tax is an 
interim fix that will become irrelevant when BEPS is eliminated, 
but is consistent with the Action Plan and may be more in line 
with the OECD’s goals than other legislation.109 “The tax rate of 
the DPT at 25% is 5% higher than [the] normal corporation tax 
and this is indicative of it being a move intended to change 
behavior; i.e. to get businesses to change the way they operate to 
anticipate the new world.”110 As a unilateral tax, it may backfire 
if other countries enact similar laws, taxing profits now allocated 
to the United Kingdom. However, it is an attempt to tax income 
locally, where the customer is located, targeting foreign 
companies which otherwise might not incur tax on these profits.  
The United Kingdom already has anti-hybrid arbitrage rules 
to prevent hybrid instrument mismatches, such as double 
deductions, or a deduction in one territory without taxing it in 
another territory. The BEPS plan recommends more stringent 
rules, however, with several key differences. First, the U.K. rules 
have a “business purpose get-out” so they only apply if the main 
purpose of the scheme is a U.K. tax advantage.111 There is no 
business purpose test or get-out in OECD rules.112 Second, in the 
United Kingdom, the anti-hybrid rules are only enacted if Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) department issues a 
notice, while the OECD rules apply to any hybrid entity or 
instrument.113 This is one example of a change that the United 
Kingdom is committed to make, but these few differences can 
make a big difference in what types of hybrid instruments will 
still be allowed. 
 
 106 John Steveni, UK Brings in Digital Tax as Ofcom Report Identifies UK Shoppers 
as the Most Prolific Online, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS: TAX BLOG (Dec. 16, 2014), 
http://pwc.blogs.com/tax/2014/12/uk-brings-in-digital-tax-as-ofcom-report-identifies-uk-
shoppers-as-the-most-prolific-online.html [http://perma.cc/CD65-82JD]. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 It is not clear whether the DPT was actually enacted with the same social justice 
goals as the Action Plan or, simply, as a mechanism to increase the tax profits earned by 
the United Kingdom. It can likely be argued that both goals influenced the U.K.’s decision 
to act preemptively. 
 110 As of April 2015, the normal corporate tax rate is 20%. Steveni, supra note 106. 
 111 BEPS: Financing and Hybrid Mismatches, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS: U.K. 
(2014), http://www.pwc.co.uk/tax/issues/beps-financing-and-hybrid-mismatches.html 
[http://perma.cc/8LCH-8U22]. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
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C.  India 
India is not a member of the OECD, but is one of the 
enhanced engagement countries (observers);114 these developing 
countries are known by the acronym BRICS.115 In March 2012, 
the Indian government criticized the OECD’s Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations, claiming that the guidelines treat developing 
source countries unfairly.116 In January 2013, the Heads of 
Revenue of the BRICS countries issued a statement that “they 
confirmed their agreement to develop a cooperative approach on 
issues relating to international taxation, transfer pricing, 
exchange of information, and tax evasion and avoidance.”117 
 In India, non-resident (foreign) companies are taxed on 
income received in India at a rate of 40%, plus various 
surcharges; there is also a minimum alternative tax of about 
20%.118 Indian companies are taxed at 30% plus surcharges,119 
but this will be lowered over the next four years to 25%.120 India 
states that tax residency “include[s] the concept of place of 
effective management.”121 India’s economy is driven by transfer 
pricing, which aims to create economically fair transactions. It 
uses the arm’s length price, which is consistent with OECD 
guidelines, and it has recently enacted safe harbour provisions to 
decrease litigation in transfer-pricing disputes.122 Although India 
has claimed that the arm’s length standard has negatively 
impacted developing countries, the United Nations has continued 
to accept it.123 The Indian government is also utilizing advance 
pricing agreement (APA) rules to cooperatively resolve 
transfer-pricing disputes, making transfer pricing less of an 
issue.124  
 
 114 The other enhanced engagement non-member countries are Brazil, China, 
Indonesia, and South Africa, and Russia is an accession candidate. About the 
OECD: Members and Partners, supra note 4. 
 115 BRICS refers to Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. David Spencer, 
BRICS, BEPS, and the U.N. Transfer Pricing Manual (Part 1), J. INT’L TAX’N, May 2013, 
at 29, 29. 
 116 Id. at 30–31. 
 117 Id. at 30. 
 118 TAX SUMMARIES, supra note 14, at 836–37 (noting that 2013–2014 surcharge is 2% 
for smaller and 10% for larger companies, plus an additional educational charge of 3%). 
 119 Id. at 836. 
 120 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LOOKING AT A NEW HORIZON: BUDGET ANALYSIS 
2015, at 1 (2015), http://www.pwc.in/en_IN/in/assets/pdfs/budget/2015/pwc-budget-flash-
2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/KUJ8-TQ4Z]. 
 121 Id. at 4. 
 122 TAX SUMMARIES, supra note 14, at 836, 849–50. 
 123 COLE & BYRNES, supra note 43. 
 124 TAX SUMMARIES, supra note 14, at 836 (commenting that multilateral APAs will 
better prevent double taxation). 
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Economists observe that India125 is unhappy that the U.S. 
multinationals do not pay what India considers to be appropriate 
taxes to the source countries, believing that the source countries 
should have the first claim on the tax money.126 Emerging 
economies like India’s have pushed the OECD to increasingly 
allow source taxation, leveraging their increased power base.127 
The OECD needs India to cooperate with the BEPS plan because 
its economy is too large and “important to the functioning of 
Western multinationals to ignore.”128 Though it is not a full 
member, India is an equal partner in the OECD’s plan, and “[t]he 
BEPS project is an attempt to get these countries back on the 
reservation.”129 The consequence of India’s dissatisfaction with 
the results of the plan will be that it will “take creative license 
with the OECD model treaties” and “continue to undermine 
international consensus from within.”130 India is concerned with 
the value added by its market and the correct way to attribute 
the worth of research and development when allocating profits.131 
The Indians “believe IP value is created where the IP is 
developed,”132 and they are not collecting the appropriate taxes. 
While India is portraying its discontent with the status quo as a 
social issue (powerful entities taking advantage of developing 
countries), transfer pricing is primarily an economic issue. 
Driven by objective, economic analysis, transfer pricing has no 
social justice element, and India’s current system of revenue 
generation (based on transfer pricing) does not lend itself to a 
BEPS fix. Although the OECD and India both wish to promote 
social justice, the OECD’s goal is to prevent companies from 
evading taxation in countries in which they generate a lot of 
income. This is not the case in India, where the income is based 
on cross-border support and R&D.  
D.  Bermuda 
Bermuda is not affiliated by any means with the OECD.133 
Bermuda has no corporate taxes.134 “Bermuda [is] a paradigm of 
 
 125 The following comments about India also apply to China. 
 126 Conceptualizing, supra note 87, at 26–27. 
 127 Brauner, supra note 26, at 63. 
 128 Sheppard, supra note 12, at 64. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Conceptualizing, supra note 87, at 17. 
 132 Jason W. Klimek, A Big Data Approach to Formulary Apportionment, CORP. 
TAX’N, May–June 2014, at 3, 6. 
 133 See About the OECD: Members and Partners, supra note 4 (identifying that other 
tax havens such as Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands are OECD member 
countries and subject to adherence to and promulgation of the BEPS Action Plan). 
 134 TAX SUMMARIES, supra note 14, at 217. See generally Warren Cabral, Bermuda: A 
Paradigm for Offshore e-Commerce, E-COMMERCE L. REP., Nov. 2000, at 1. 
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what is available for the e-commerce trader to maximize profit 
and opportunity and to minimize regulatory interference.”135 
There are no capital gains taxes, VAT, sales taxes, excise taxes, 
transfer taxes, or stamp taxes imposed on exempt companies 
(those owned by non-Bermudans).136 Multinational corporations 
are only considered to be resident companies if they have 
resident employees who fall under the Bermuda payroll tax.137 
Also, the government has “extended the tax exemption granted to 
Bermuda companies under the Exempt Undertakings Act of 1976 
from 28 March 2016 until 2035.”138 Existing companies must 
apply for the extension of tax exemption, which protects them 
from any new income or capital gains taxes through 2035. 
Clearly, Bermuda must get something out of having so many 
multinationals incorporated in their country; the companies pay 
a yearly fee. Every year, the company files a report with the 
Registrar of Companies, noting its assessable capital, and pays a 
sliding scale fee based on its net worth, with a maximum rate of 
$31,120.139 As a country, Bermuda’s income is derived primarily 
from its function as a maximum tax haven. There is no incentive 
for it to change, work with OECD, or support the BEPS plan, and 
it has extended its tax haven status for the next twenty years.  
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Clearly, BEPS is a huge issue with a plethora of interlocking 
factors. Not surprisingly, there are an equally large number of 
recommendations by industry experts analyzing the plan, 
regarding how to address its problems, some of which are 
contradictory or mutually exclusive. The largest difficulty is how 
to convince all of the countries involved to agree on a multilateral 
plan and enforce its various parts. Evaluating the issues and 
their potential resolutions in terms of the individual countries 
discussed is not particularly useful, since only multilateral 
agreements will solve the problems. Also, until the motivations of 
the countries involved are aligned with those of the OECD (social 
justice rather than income generation), the Action Plan is at risk 
for failure. Some of the most promising measures to combat 
BEPS include a byte tax, a shift from arm’s length to formulary 
apportionment, the common consolidated corporate tax base, and 
 
 135 Cabral, supra note 134 (noting that Bermuda is an excellent offshore tax haven 
that permits a business to avoid the heavy-handed restrictions of a government like the 
United States).  
 136 TAX SUMMARIES, supra note 14, at 217–21. 
 137 Id. at 217–18 (stating that resident employees must work four consecutive weeks 
in a calendar year). 
 138 Id. at 217. 
 139 Id. at 219. 
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a multilateral entity that would have some actual authority over 
international taxation.  
A.  Applying a Byte Tax to Intangibles 
While this is not directly addressed in the OECD Action Plan 
(since there are no recommendations specifically about the digital 
economy), a byte140 tax appears to be one of the most objectively 
fair solutions for each country to earn the taxes they feel they are 
owed. Some countries are evaluating the byte tax as a method to 
gain “non-income tax jurisdiction over digital economy companies 
having no physical presence there.”141 They present the 
reasonable argument that intangibles should be taxed in the 
country in which the customer lives, because the product is 
changed when it is used by the customer.142 For example, France 
wants to tax Google for selling information on French customers 
to its advertisers (looking at where the income-generating 
information is being created). However, they do not want French 
companies to pay taxes when foreigners buy French merchandise 
(looking at where the customer is located).143 
The United States has expressed no interest in applying a 
byte tax, but this may not be the best decision. It has addressed 
the problem in the Internet Tax Freedom Act,144 and has recently 
struck down the consideration again in the “Net Neutrality” 
decisions.145 The justification appears to be that the United 
States does not want the MNEs principally based in its 
jurisdiction to have to pay byte taxes to other countries, even if 
taxes cannot be collected in the United States either.146 This 
reticence in taxing the Internet stems from a resistance to doing 
so when it was formed; there was a concern that taxation would 
hinder the presented opportunities for expansion and innovation. 
Over the past decades, the Internet has exponentially expanded, 
and every other industry of its size and influence faces taxation. 
 
 140 “Byte” and “bit” both refer to digital data (a byte is a sequence of bits), and can be 
used interchangeably regarding the tax. Byte, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/byte [http://perma.cc/Y3UB-ZKKU]. 
 141 Sheppard, supra note 12, at 69 (mentioning that France believes a byte tax would 
be an ideal solution). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id.  
 144 See Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
 145 FCC Adopts Strong, Sustainable Rules to Protect the Open Internet: Rules Will 
Preserve the Internet as a Platform for Innovation, Free Expression and Economic Growth, 
FCC (Feb. 26, 2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-332260A1.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/C6UF-EJLD] [hereinafter FCC Rules] (“Broadband service will remain 
exempt from state and local taxation under the Internet Tax Freedom Act. This law, 
recently renewed by Congress and signed by the President, bans state and local taxation 
on Internet access regardless of its FCC regulatory classification.”).  
 146 Sheppard, supra note 12, at 69–70. 
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“If governments choose to tax consumption in general—and most 
of them do, through value-added or sales taxes—it’s logical to tax 
data consumption, too.”147 It is no longer reasonable to believe 
that taxation would present a substantial obstacle to the 
Internet’s expansion or its utilization. However, the United 
States does not have any federal sales or value-added taxes, so 
this would be a major change. Also, this could be seen as a 
regressive tax, which would disproportionately burden 
consumers, creating a greater tax burden for those lower-income 
individuals who spend a larger percentage of their income. 
It is impractical to tax individuals using the Internet based 
on the bytes they utilize, because that would be 
disproportionately cumbersome on individuals and the 
government. Assessment, collection, enforcement, and payment 
would all be exceedingly complex.148 In addition, this tax might 
actually present a deterrence to Internet use and development, 
which is not the purpose of a tax.149 Rather, corporations should 
incur a tax based on where the bytes originate. If a person on the 
Internet purchases a product on Amazon in the United States, 
the United States will recognize the profit, and Amazon will face 
taxation in the United States. Although this is bad news for the 
multinational companies that would quickly begin to accumulate 
varying taxes in each jurisdiction where a byte tax is 
implemented, it seems to be an equitable method to assess taxes. 
This increased tax might, however, just be passed on to the 
consumer via an increased price, but it presents an opportunity 
for the countries to act in a reasonable, consistent manner that is 
beneficial to each, rather than taking unilateral actions which 
will only cause turmoil. The recent “Net Neutrality” decisions 
promote transparency; this will better allow for a monitoring of 
individuals purchasing goods online and a determination of 
where multinational companies should incur taxes.150 There are 
quite a number of issues that would need to be addressed before 
a byte tax could be practically implemented, including the 
amount of contact a country would need to have with a 
transaction before it could claim the right to tax the revenue, and 
how Internet transactions should be taxed.  
 
 147 A.L., Hungary’s Internet Tax: A Bit of Protest, ECONOMIST (Oct. 30, 2014, 10:44 
AM), http://www.economist.com/node/21629492 [http://perma.cc/B6S9-74CY].  
 148 E.g., Annette Nellen, Internet Usage or Bit Tax?, 21ST CENTURY TAX’N (Mar. 18, 
2010), 21stcenturytaxation.blogspot.com/2010/03/internet-usage-or-bit-tax.html [http://per 
ma.cc/RF8N-MFKG]. 
 149 Id. 
 150 FCC Rules, supra note 145. 
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B.  Replacing Arm’s Length with Formulary Apportionment 
Another area that has been addressed is the value of 
replacing the arm’s length principle with formulary 
apportionment, and this appears to be a particularly promising 
area of reform.151 Alternatively, a combination of arm’s length 
and formulary apportionment could be most successful for 
companies with a significant IP component.152 The Action Plan 
requires an allocation of profits associated with intangibles to be 
in accordance with value creation, which is essentially formulary 
apportionment without calling it that.153 The OECD’s problem 
with formulary apportionment has been its rejection of a 
“one-size-fits all” principle, and the traditional factors of 
property, sales, and payroll are not relevant to the digital 
economy.154 However, “a hybrid approach using big data would 
allow countries to identify relevant factors to a given industry to 
accurately capture the value generated by that industry.”155 
While arm’s length works for material goods, intangibles have 
“an intrinsic value that simply cannot be captured by a 
comparable uncontrolled price.”156 Many technology companies, 
such as Apple, Google, and Microsoft, are collecting and 
analyzing data (“big data”) about users, such as location, which 
could be utilized to determine what profits should be associated 
with which country. These statistics could easily be modified to 
determine the relevant factors useful for formulary 
apportionment, as it entails no extra expense (companies are 
already collecting it) and is more transparent.157 “Further, value 
creation attributable to location based data collection is also 
attributable to that country’s contribution to the firm’s collection 
activities.”158 Combining sales information and data collection, 
one can obtain a clear picture of the value that can be allocated to 
each country. Using this type of formulary apportionment would 
address the transfer-pricing manipulations, which allow IP 
companies to avoid taxes so well, and a hybrid approach could 
work for IP or traditional manufacturing companies.159  
 
 151 See generally COLE & BYRNES, supra note 43. Lee Sheppard agrees, noting that 
she does not believe the BEPS plan will be successful. Sheppard, supra note 12, at 62–63 
(“In the long run, we already know what the outcome will be—apportionment of 
multinationals’ profits based on sales.”).  
 152 Klimek, supra note 132, at 3. 
 153 Id.  
 154 Id. at 3–4. 
 155 Id. at 3. 
 156 Id. at 4 (defining a comparable uncontrolled price as the best way to determine the 
arm's length transfer price for material goods). 
 157 Id. at 4–6.  
 158 Id. at 5.  
 159 See generally id.  
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C.  Utilizing a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base  
Another type of formulary apportionment with significant 
potential to combat BEPS, the common consolidated corporate 
tax base (CCCTB), is being evaluated in Europe.160 The CCCTB 
would involve computing and consolidating tax results in the EU 
based on sharing Global Corporate Tax Information.161 The 
“CCCTB model treats the group as a single entity for tax 
purposes,” and “can be viewed as a multilateral method for the 
exchange of Global Corporate Tax Information at the EU 
level.”162 The EU has already introduced the legal Europe entity, 
which is not an entity of any particular EU country, but issues 
still exist concerning the appropriate amount of profit to be 
allocated to each country. The CCCTB has several 
tax-neutralizing effects on groups in member countries. 
Cross-border transfers within the group do not generate taxable 
capital gains or losses (only relevant outside the group). 
Intra-group cross-border dividends are exempt to prevent double 
taxation, and aggressive transfer pricing and profit shifting 
would be unnecessary, since there would be no high- or low-tax 
jurisdictions within the group.163 The larger the group of 
countries consolidating, the more advantageous to BEPS. While 
an EU directive would require the consent of all twenty-seven 
EU states (which is unlikely), approval though enhanced 
cooperation would only require nine.164 The United States could 
voluntarily join the EU members to exchange information and 
consolidate its tax base, because if the United States acts as a 
high-tax residence country and does not exchange information, it 
cannot protect its tax base.165 Along with information exchange 
such as FATCA, this level of cooperation could substantially 
improve BEPS.  
D.  Creating a Multilateral Instrument 
A multilateral instrument, one with the power to enforce the 
OECD’s recommendations, would alleviate the greatest 
difficulties in implementing the Action Plan. Executing the plan 
will require unprecedented amounts of cooperation by many 
different countries and multilateral agreements, which will not 
always benefit those countries. “In the realm of taxation, where 
tax revenues are used to provide governmental services, in the 
 
 160 Sheppard, supra note 12, at 63. 
 161 Garbarino, supra note 67, at 137–38, 157. 
 162 Id. at 158.  
 163 Id. at 159.  
 164 Id.  
 165 Id. at 165.  
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end, everyone loses if no one cooperates.”166 By cooperating, the 
winner wins a little less, but no one loses, and the countries  
get equal benefit. For the BEPS plan to succeed, a 
collaborative-based paradigm must replace competition, a holistic 
and comprehensive approach is needed, and some necessary 
innovations may be outside the traditional area of tax policies.167 
Companies must cooperate with governments, and countries 
must cooperate with each other. This is, of course, the ultimate 
challenge for the OECD, since it is in each company’s best 
interest to pay as little in taxes as they legally can. Also, there is 
little incentive for a country, like the United States, to have its 
corporate taxpayers pay any more to other countries,168 or for 
Bermuda to start charging taxes or change its policies. However, 
to overcome these obstacles, and for the BEPS plan to work, all of 
the countries involved need to be motivated to cooperate in ways 
which will allow for equitable taxation of multinational 
corporations. The OECD countries could require that all profits 
be subject to some form of taxation, decreasing the value of 
low-tax jurisdictions, and incentivizing countries like Bermuda to 
raise their taxes. A multilateral regulatory body would certainly 
aid this process. Unfortunately, without any power to enforce its 
regulations, the OECD can only make suggestions and hope for 
implementation of its Action Plan.  
CONCLUSION 
Multinational corporations have found a means by which to 
avoid paying taxes, and have mastered the ability to shift their 
profits to low-tax jurisdictions and erode the tax base of those 
jurisdictions with higher corporate tax rates. This problem has 
only been exacerbated in recent years with the ever-increasing 
presence and influence of the Internet on the economy. The top 
technological companies have masked billions of dollars worth of 
taxes by cleverly manipulating the tax laws to elicit double 
non-taxation. 
The OECD’s BEPS Action Plan provides a comprehensive 
analysis of the current issues faced by governments in their 
international taxing policies, with measures designed to 
ameliorate the problems. However, the OECD faces the issue 
that there is no way for it to effectively implement its plan, as the 
 
 166 Klimek, supra note 132, at 6. 
 167 Brauner, supra note 26, at 112. 
 168 Sheppard, supra note 12, at 68–70 (“The trouble is that the Americans don’t 
appear to want Google to be paying byte taxes or income taxes to other countries. Most of 
the big digital players are American, and few of them pay tax anywhere, including the 
United States.”). 
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organization as a whole has no actual authority. Another obstacle 
to the OECD plan involves its ultimate motivation for change. 
The goal of the Action Plan is to promote social justice for all 
countries. Member countries, such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom, who are suffering from lost tax revenues, hope 
that the BEPS plan will aid their tax collections, but are less 
concerned with equity. While the United States has considered 
implementing unilateral actions, there has not been a great deal 
of change to the corporate tax rate in recent years, nor has the 
government considered adopting a measure other than the arm’s 
length standard. The U.S. Congress is ambivalent about 
changing tax laws, which will make their big business 
constituents unhappy. Additionally, a serious hindrance to the 
plan is a country like Bermuda. Bermuda, a tax haven for those 
companies burdened with hefty taxes in their residence 
jurisdiction, entices these multinational businesses and offers the 
opportunity to pay zero taxes. The presence of these companies 
helps Bermuda’s economy, and they are able to self-regulate, 
leaving very little incentive for Bermuda to change its ways. 
Thus, the countries facing BEPS must find a way to track 
taxes due from these companies, despite the obstacles of tax 
havens. Ultimately, this means that a new system of taxation 
must be implemented, and countries must adopt a cooperative 
paradigm to work for the betterment of all, rather than the 
colossal wealth of the few. A byte tax could allocate taxes 
associated with the digital economy in an equitable fashion. 
Formulary apportionment could replace the arm’s length 
standard, which has outgrown its usefulness. A CCCTB could 
combat BEPS by eliminating some of its causal mechanisms 
(such as variable tax jurisdictions). While everyone agrees that a 
multilateral instrument is needed to facilitate change, this 
requires Congress to stand up to corporate lobbyists, 
governments to agree, and corporations to play by the rules.  
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